Claroty

Effectively securing its generation and transmission operations required the company to confront and overcome the following challenges:Inherently insecure OT networks: Complex and widely distributed architecture, limited OT visibility, and inadequate security controls gave attackers hundreds of possible entry points into the company’s OT networks.OT redundancy: The redundancy of the company’s OT environment meant that attacks were typically only detected if they caused immediate, easily noticeable damage. Heavy reliance on OT remote access: The company’s power plants utilize a large number of unmanned power generation units and also rely on multiple vendors to maintain and service their heat recovery generation systems (HRGS). 

Parkland Health, a renowned healthcare institution, was facing several challenges in managing its clinical asset ecosystem. The existing data validity was not meeting the requirements of the Clinical Engineering (CE) and Information Security (IS) teams. The existing workflows were not aligned with the strategic vision of the leadership. The institution was unable to dynamically update their computerized maintenance management system (CMMS), which was crucial for efficient asset management. There were significant change-management hurdles between isolated teams, which were hindering the smooth execution of projects. Moreover, Parkland had allocated an insufficient budget to maintain project momentum and meet all expected outcomes.

The mass rapid transit system, with over 20 lines spanning nearly 1,500 kilometers, transports billions of passengers annually across urban and suburban districts. The system relies on specialized industrial networks for railway electrification, signaling, communications, and an extensive building management system (BMS) for station and tunnel ventilation, lighting, and physical security. The rail operator faced challenges in maintaining visibility and control across these networks while adhering to stringent international safety integrity level (SIL) standards. The digitization and connectivity demands of passengers and vendors, who require timely updates and access to OT, IoT, and IIoT assets, posed a significant challenge. The legacy OT systems, designed with isolation in mind, were not equipped to connect and communicate with IT systems and the internet. The rail operator had no visibility into their industrial networks, making response and remediation of system failures difficult. Compliance with SIL standards was mandatory, and any third-party equipment introduced into the network had to work independently from safety-critical systems or integrate without affecting these systems and triggering recertification. The multiple layers of legacy OT systems, designed for a lifespan of 25 to 50 years, added further complexity to modernization efforts.

The consumer goods arm of a global conglomerate, manufacturing a wide range of products, faced significant challenges in securing its operational technology (OT) environment. The company's manufacturing sites are spread globally, with some being decades old and others relatively new. The company had to manage a multitude of devices and systems, along with remote access for numerous third-party contractors, which added to the complexity of its industrial cybersecurity posture. The company was relying on traditional, IT-centric security tools that were incompatible with its OT environment. This, along with the prevalence of legacy systems, inconsistent documentation of OT assets, and diverse geographies and local practices, made gaining full visibility into its OT environment a daunting task. The company also struggled with unmonitored remote access and misconfigurations, which led to downtime. Furthermore, the company's growth through acquisitions resulted in a patchwork of systems from multiple vendors, complicating its IT and OT security. The company also lacked OT anomaly detection capabilities, which are crucial for quick response to operational disruptions.